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Abstract 
This paper elaborates the approach to the longitudinal analysis of income-related health 
inequalities first proposed in Allanson, Gerdtham and Petrie (2010).  In particular, the paper 
establishes the normative basis of their mobility indices by embedding their decomposition of 
the change in the health concentration index within a broader analysis of the change in 
“health achievement” or wellbeing.  The paper further shows that their decomposition 
procedure can also be used to analyse the change in a range of other commonly-used income-
related health inequality measures, including the generalised concentration index and the 
relative inequality index.  We illustrate our work by extending their investigation of mobility 
in the General Health Questionnaire measure of psychological well-being over the first nine 
waves of the British Household Panel Survey from 1991 to 1999.  
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1. Introduction 
In a recent paper, Allanson, Gerdtham and Petrie (2010; hereafter AGP) consider the 
characterisation and measurement of income-related health inequality using longitudinal 
data.  In particular, they propose a novel decomposition of the change in the conventional 
health concentration index (CI) between two periods that yields an index of income-related 
health mobility, which captures the effect on cross-sectional income-related health inequality 
of the relationship between relative health changes and individuals’ initial level of income, 
and an index of health-related income mobility, which captures the effect of the reshuffling 
of individuals within the income distribution on cross-sectional socioeconomic inequalities 
in health.  The aim of this paper is to extend this work in two directions. 
 First we draw on the literature on the welfare economics foundations of the health 
concentration index to explore the normative basis of the AGP mobility indices.  In 
particular, we note that the concentration index is the inequality component of the “health 
achievement index” of Wagstaff (2002).  Accordingly, the AGP analysis of the change in 
income-related health inequality can be embedded within a broader analysis of the change in 
social welfare or wellbeing, with their decomposition serving to identify how much of the 
change in the income-related health inequality component is driven by changes in health 
outcomes (i.e. “health mobility”) and how much by changes in individuals’ positions in the 
income distribution (i.e. “income (rank) mobility”).  
 Second we show that the AGP decomposition procedure may also be used to analyse 
the change in a range of other commonly-used health inequality measures, including the 
generalised concentration index (GC) and the relative inequality index (RII) (Wagstaff et al., 
1991).  The choice of inequality index is important as it is known to affect the conclusions 
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drawn in comparative studies (see, for example, Clark et al., 2002) and this dependence will 
inevitably carry over to any mobility index that is derived from the decomposition of the 
change in such indices over time.  In particular, mobility indices based on relative and 
absolute income-related health inequality measures respectively embody ‘rightist’ and 
‘leftist’ inequality equivalence criteria,1 with the former invariant to equiproportionate 
changes in health across all income groups whereas the latter are invariant to equal absolute 
changes in health across all income groups.  Following the literature on income inequality, 
relative measures have been more widely used in empirical work on health inequalities, but 
absolute measures have the advantage that they are invariant to whether inequality is 
measured with respect to health or morbidity (Clark et al., 2002; Erreygers, 2009). 
 The paper is structured as follows.  The following section explores the ethical basis 
for the income-related health and health-related income mobility indices proposed by AGP.   
Parallel analyses are also provided based on the change in the generalised concentration 
index and with inequality measured with respect to morbidity rather than health.  Section 3 
investigates the implications of the choice of inequality index by expanding on the empirical 
application in AGP, which investigates the dynamics of income and mental health over the 
first nine waves of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) using the General Health 
Questionnaire (GHQ) measure of psychological well-being (Goldberg and Williams, 1988).  
The final section summarises the contribution of the paper. 
 
                                                 
1 In the current context, an inequality equivalence criterion specifies how, given the joint distribution of health 
and income, an additional amount of health should be distributed in order to leave income-related health 
inequality unchanged with respect to the starting distribution.  See Zoli (2003) for a general discussion of 
inequality equivalence criteria in relation to the measurement of income inequality. 
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2. Welfare foundations of the AGP mobility indices 
The welfare economics foundations of the concentration index have variously been 
explored by Bommier and Stecklov (2002), Wagstaff (2002) and Bleichrodt & van Doorslaer 
(2006) among others. We draw on this literature to elucidate the ethical basis for the 
measures of income-related health mobility and health-related income mobility proposed by 
AGP.  Thus, our analysis focuses on a single transition between an initial period s and some 
final period f (f>s).  Let Ψ(hs , ys , hf , yf) be the joint cumulative distribution function (cdf) of 
health, H, and income, Y, in the two periods, where ht  and yt  denote health and income 
respectively in period t (t = s, f), and the health measure lies in the bounded interval b≥  ht≥a 
with a ≥0 by assumption.  Moreover, let ( )
t tH Y t t
h ,yψ  be the joint probability density function 
(pdf) of health and income in period t, which can in turn be expressed as the product of the 
conditional pdf of health given income, ( )|
t tH |Y t t
h yψ , and the marginal pdf of income, 
( )
tY t
yψ .  Finally, let πt=  ( )
tY t
yΨ  be the marginal cdf for incomes in period t, where πt  is the 
proportion of the population with an income in that period less than yt .  The corresponding 
quantile function will be Yt(πt) = ( )1
tY t
π−Ψ  for πt∈[0,1], which may loosely be thought of as 
the income of an individual with a (normalised) rank of π in the period t distribution (Yaari, 
1988).  Hence, ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )1 1|0 0| |t tbt t H Y t t t t t t t taE h h h Y dh d E h dψ π π π π= = =∫ ∫ ∫  will be mean 
health in period t, where ( )|t tE h π  is mean health conditional upon income rank.   
We begin with the social welfare function that underpins the “health achievement” 
index proposed by Wagstaff (2002).2  This function defines overall wellbeing in any period 
                                                 
2 But note that Wagstaff considers a health indicator that provides a measure of ill rather than good health.  We 
consider how this affects the analysis at the end of this section. 
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as a weighted average of the health of all individuals, where the weights are determined by 
individuals’ ranks in the income distribution.  Specifically, let wellbeing in period t evaluated 
on the basis of income ranks πt  in period t be equal to:   
( )
( )( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
1 1
0 0
1 1
0 0
( , )
( , ) | ( , )
| | 1 ,
1
t t
t
t t
b
tt t H Y t t t t ty a
b
t H |Y t t t t t t t t t ta
t t t t t t t
t tt t tt
W h h , y w v dh dy t=s, f
h h |Y dh w v d E h w v d
E h d E h w v d
h GC h CI
ψ π
ψ π π π π π π
π π π π π
=
= =
= − −
= − = −
∫ ∫
∫ ∫ ∫
∫ ∫
  (1) 
where the rank-dependent weights are given by:  
( 1)( , ) (1 ) ; 1vt tw v v vπ π
−
= − ≥ ; (2) 
ttGC  is the extended generalised health concentration coefficient; and tt tt tCI GC h=  is the 
extended health concentration index.   
Equation (1) is formally a member of the rank-dependent S-Gini class of functions 
(see Yitzhaki, 1983) but with ranks based on the distribution of income rather than health.  
The ‘distributional judgement’ parameter v controls the rate at which the weights decrease 
from poorest to richest.  Specifically, v=2 leads to weights that decrease linearly with πt  from 
2 to 0, as with the conventional concentration index, whereas values greater (less) than 2 
yield indices that give more (less) social weight to the health of poorer individuals than 
implied by the conventional health concentration index (see Wagstaff, 2002).  In the limit v  
=1 and the social weights are independent of rank.   
ttGC  and ttCI  provide measures of absolute and relative income-related health 
inequality respectively, which typically will be positive as a result of the positive association 
between income and health status.  Within our framework, ttGC  and ttCI  may be interpreted 
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as ‘cost of inequality’ indices in the sense of Atkinson (1970), providing measures of the 
amount of health per head that could be sacrificed with no loss of overall wellbeing if the 
remainder were to be distributed equally.  Bleichrodt & van Doorslaer (2006) examine the 
preference foundations of this type of measure, showing that the health concentration index 
implies that social preferences over health distributions or profiles must be both complete 
and transitive, and satisfy standard principles of anonymity, additivity, monotonicity and 
population independence.  Additionally, social preferences must satisfy the principle of 
income-related health transfers whereby a health transfer from a richer individual to a poorer 
individual does not lead to a reduction in wellbeing provided the transfer does not change the 
income rankings of the two individuals. If health is an increasing function of income then 
such transfers will on average be from healthier to unhealthier individuals, but this might not 
be so in particular cases.  Bleichrodt & van Doorslaer (2006, p.955) conclude that the 
principle will “be more acceptable the stronger the correlation between health and […] 
income”. 
The formulation of the income-related health inequality measures in (1) makes plain 
that ttGC  and ttCI  are determined solely by expected health levels conditional upon income 
(rank) and are not therefore affected by the degree of conditional dispersion of health 
outcomes about these levels.  ttGC  and ttCI  may therefore be directly interpreted as W1  type 
indicators in the sense of Bommier and Stecklov (2002) in that they will take positive 
(negative) values if expected health is a monotonically increasing (decreasing) function of 
income, and will equal zero if expected health is independent of income.  Nevertheless, even 
if health endowments did not affect income levels, ttGC  and ttCI  would not be fully 
consistent with a Rawlsian approach to health inequalities in that they do not depend on the 
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full distribution of health conditional on income, but only its average (Bommier and 
Stecklov, 2002).  
 
AGP analysis of changes in relative health inequality 
AGP propose a decomposition of the change in the health concentration index between two 
periods into income-related health and health-related income mobility indices.  Within our 
framework, the key to this decomposition is the ex-ante evaluation of wellbeing in period f  
based on individuals’ income rank positions in period s: 
( )
( )( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
1 1
0 0
1 1
0 0
( , )
( , ) | ( , )
| | 1 , 1
f s
s
f s
b
fs f H Y f s s f sy a
b
f H |Y f s s f s s f s s sa
f s s f s s s f fs f fs
W h h , y w v dh dy
h h |Y dh w v d E h w v d
E h d E h w v d h GC h CI
ψ π
ψ π π π π π π
π π π π π
=
= =
= − − = − = −
∫ ∫
∫ ∫ ∫
∫ ∫
 (3) 
where ( )
f sH Y f s
h , yψ  is the joint density of final period health and initial period income, 
( )|f sE h π  is mean health in period f conditional upon income rank in period s, and 
( )( )
f sH |Y f s s
h |Yψ π , fsGC  and fsCI   are interpreted analogously to ( )( )t tH |Y t t th |Yψ π , ttGC  and 
ttCI .  In particular, if v=2 then fsCI  is the concentration index of final period health ranked 
by initial income, providing the reference statistic for the ‘ex-ante’ decomposition of AGP. 
 Using (3) the decomposition provided by AGP may be embedded within a broader 
analysis of the change in wellbeing between the two periods:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
( ) 1 1 1
1
1
ff ss f ff s ss ss ff ss f
ss ss fs fs ff f
CI CI
ss H R f
W W h CI h CI h CI CI CI h
h CI CI CI CI CI h
h CI M M h
− = − − − = Δ − − −
= Δ − + − + −
= Δ − + −
 (4) 
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where the first term gives the effect on wellbeing of the mean change in health f sh h hΔ = −  
and the second that due to the change in relative inequality ( )ff ssCI CI− .  Equation (4) 
makes plain that ceteris paribus increases (decreases) in relative inequality will reduce (raise) 
wellbeing.  The AGP decomposition of ( )ff ssCI CI−  then serves to identify whether such 
changes in income-related health inequality are driven by changes in health outcomes (i.e. 
“health mobility”) or by changes in individuals’ positions in the income distribution (i.e. 
“income (rank) mobility”).  
 Thus, the income-related health mobility index CIHM  captures the effect of health 
changes on relative income-related health inequality, being determined by the relationship 
between relative health changes and individuals’ initial level of income:  
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( )
1
0
1
0
1
0
,
||
1 ,
| ||
1 ,
||
1 ,
f ss sCI
H ss fs s s
s f
f s s sf s s s
s s
s f f
f s ss s
s s
s f
ss f s s
f
CI CI
E hE h
M CI CI w v d
h h
E h E hh h E h
w v d
h h h
E h hE h hw v d
h hh
hCI CI
h
P q
ππ
π π
π ππ
π π
ππ
π π
−
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟= − = − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞
−
−⎜ ⎟= − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞
− ⎛ ⎞Δ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟= − − ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟Δ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞Δ
= − ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
≡
∫
∫
∫  (5) 
where ( ) ( )| |f s s sE h h E hπ π− = Δ  denotes conditional expected health changes; and ,f s sCI −  
is the concentration coefficient of health changes ranked by initial period income.  This 
provides an ‘ex-ante’ measure in that the evaluation of the costs of inequality in both the 
initial and final periods is based on the social weights associated with individuals’ ranks in 
the initial income distribution.  This asymmetric treatment may be justified, in the spirit of 
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Dardanoni (1993), on the grounds that the initially poor are disadvantaged to the extent that 
they face a worse lottery of future health possibilities than those who are better off, with the 
‘distributional judgement’ parameter v  allowing for the calibration of the poverty focus of the 
evaluation (see Essama-Nssah, 2005).  It is also possible in principle to employ individuals’ 
final period weights to evaluate mobility (see, for example, the alternative income-related 
health mobility index considered in AGP) but the forward-looking perspective is the more 
natural one when assessing the impact of mobility over time. 
Progressivity in this framework is captured by the Kakwani (1977)-type 
disproportionality index ( ),CI ss f s sP CI CI −= − .  CIP will be positive (negative) if the poorest 
individuals either enjoy a larger (smaller) share of total health gains or suffer a larger 
(smaller) share of total health losses compared to their initial share of health, and equals zero 
if relative health changes are independent of income or there are no health changes.  For any 
given CIP , the gross impact on final period income-related health inequalities is proportional 
to the scale of health changes, CI fq h h= Δ  measured as the ratio of average health changes 
to average final period health.3  AGP observe that CIP  can provide a useful measure of the 
performance of health improvement programmes in targeting the poor: a given reduction in 
income-related health inequality can be achieved either by a small-scale but highly targeted 
intervention to improve the average health of the very poor or by a larger scale but broader 
health programme.  The impact of welfare programmes may also be equalising if the 
                                                 
3 Note that if the average health change is negative, then negative (positive) values of CIP  imply that health 
depreciation is equalising (disequalising) in relative terms in the sense that it will lead to a ceteris paribus 
reduction (increase) in relative health inequality. 
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payment of income support to the poor results in contemporaneous improvements in their 
health on average. 
 Conversely, the health-related income mobility index CIRM  captures the effect of 
income rank changes on (relative) income-related health inequality, being determined by the 
relationship between income rank changes and individuals’ final level of health: 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
1 1
0 0
1 1
0 0
1 1
0 0
| |
1 , 1 ,
| ,
, ,
| ,
, ,
f s
f s
f f f sCI
R ff fs f f s s
f f
f f s
s f Y |Y f f s s f s
f
f f s f
s f Y |Y f f s s f s
f
E h E h
M CI CI w v d w v d
h h
E h
w v w v Y |Y d d
h
E h h
w v w v Y |Y d d
h
π π
π π π π
π π
π π ψ π π π π
π π
π π ψ π π π π
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟= − = − − −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟= −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞
−⎜ ⎟= −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∫ ∫
∫ ∫
∫ ∫
 (6) 
where ( )| ,f s fE h π π is mean health in period f conditional upon income rank in both periods, 
( ) ( )( )f sY |Y f f s sY |Yψ π π  is the density of final period income conditional on initial income, and 
the final equality holds because ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )1 10 0 , , 0f ss f Y |Y f f s s f sw v w v Y |Y d dπ π ψ π π π π− =∫ ∫ .  
CI
RM  is  analogous to the re-ranking index proposed by Atkinson (1980) and Plotnick (1981), 
and considered by Yitzhaki and Wodon (2004) as a measure of mobility in its own right, but 
may take on negative as well as positive values.  Specifically, CIRM will be positive (negative) 
if the concentration index of final period health outcomes ranked by final income is greater 
(less) than that ranked by initial income, which implies that current health is more (less) 
strongly related to contemporaneous income than to lagged incomes,4 and will equal zero if 
either final period health is uncorrelated with changes in income rank or there are no changes 
                                                 
4 It is readily shown from Milanovic (1997) that ff ssCI CI> implies ( ) ( ), ,f f f scorr h corr hπ π>  in the special 
case v=2. 
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in income rank.5  Nevertheless, AGP argue that CIRM may generally be expected to be 
positive, exacerbating inequalities, since those who move up the income ranking will tend to 
be healthier (in the final period) than those who moved down.  AGP further note that the 
impact on income-related health inequality of health interventions targeted at the poor will be 
diminished to the extent that health improvements lead to contemporaneous increases in 
income (rank), but that welfare programmes may reduce inequality due to re-ranking if 
recipients move up the income distribution and income (rank) gains are not matched by 
contemporaneous improvements in health.   
 
Longitudinal analysis of changes in absolute health inequality 
AGP focus on changes in relative income-related health inequality, but a parallel analysis is 
also feasible within our framework based on the change in absolute health inequality between 
the two periods.  Thus, equation (4) may be rewritten as:  
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
( )
( )ff ss f ff s ss ff ss
ss fs fs ff
GC GC
H R
W W h GC h GC h GC GC
h GC GC GC GC
h M M
− = − − − = Δ − −
= Δ + − + −
= Δ + −
 (7) 
where the first and second terms again give the effects on wellbeing due to the change in 
mean health and income-related health inequality respectively, but these terms are now 
additive.  Thus the first term is invariant to the initial distribution of total health among the 
population while the second term is invariant to the final level of average health.  Moreover 
the second term is now invariant to equal absolute, rather than  proportionate, changes in the 
                                                 
5 Note that if there are no changes in rank then ( ) ( ), ,s fw v w vπ π= and ( )| | 1f s f s sπ πψ π π π= =  for all 
πf  ∈[0,1].  
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health of all individuals, yielding indices of absolute income-related health and health-related 
income mobility, GCHM and 
GC
RM  respectively. 
 GCHM  captures the effect of health changes on absolute income-related health 
inequality, being determined by the relationship between absolute health changes and 
individuals’ initial level of income:  
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )
1
0
1
0
,
,
| | 1 ,
| 1 ,
GC
H ss fs s s f s s s
f s s s s
f s s
GC GC
f s s
M GC GC E h E h w v d
E h h w v d
GC
CI h P q
π π π π
π π π
−
−
= − = − −
= − − −
= −
= − Δ ≡
∫
∫  (8) 
where ,f s sGC −  is the generalised concentration index of health changes ranked by initial 
period income, which provides an ‘ex-ante’ measure of the change in the absolute health 
costs of inequality between the two periods.  This measure may in turn be expressed in terms 
of an absolute disproportionality index ,
GC
f s sP CI −= − ,
6 which provides an alternative 
measure of targeting performance, and the scale factor GCq h= Δ .  The commonly held belief 
that the first priority of healthcare policy should be to heal the sick, who are 
disproportionately poor, implies that healthcare outcomes should be equalising not just in 
relative but also in absolute terms, i.e. that GCP should be positive for beneficial health 
interventions.  We note that CIP <0 implies GCP <0 if 0ssCI > , since health changes must be 
concentrated among the rich if the poorest individuals experience a smaller share of total 
health changes than their initial share of health, but not vice versa. 
                                                 
6 Note that if the average health change is negative, then PGC will be negative (positive) if health depreciation is 
equalising (disequalising) in absolute terms such that absolute health losses tend to be larger (smaller) for rich 
individuals than poor ones. 
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GC
RM  captures the effect of income rank changes on absolute income-related health 
inequality, being determined by the relationship between income rank changes and 
individuals’ final level of health: 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
1 1
0 0
1 1
|0 0
| 1 , | 1 ,
| , , , |
f s
GC
R ff fs f f f f f s s s
f f s s f f s f s
CI
f R
M GC GC E h w v d E h w v d
E h w v w v d d
h M
π π
π π π π π π
π π π π ψ π π π π
= − = − − −
= −
=
∫ ∫
∫ ∫  (9) 
which is simply a scaled version of CIRM , as is shown by the final equality, and will therefore 
share the same properties as the relative health-related income mobility index.  
 
Analysis of changes in ill-health inequality 
AGP focus on income-related health inequalities, but the preceding analysis may readily be 
refashioned in terms of changes in income-related inequalities in ill-health or morbidity 
rather than in health or wellbeing.  Suppose that we have some measure of ill-health or 
morbidity ( )U b H= − 7 with corresponding bounds ( )0 U b-a≤ ≤  then (1) may be rewritten as: 
( ) ( )
( )( )( )
( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
0
1
0 0
1
0
1 1
0 0
( , )
( , )
| ( , )
| | 1 ,
1
t t
t
t t
b a
tt t H Y t t t t ty
b a
t H |Y t t t t t t
t t t t
t t t t t t t
U U
t tt t tt
W b u b u , y w v du dy t=s, f
b u b u |Y du w v d
b E u w v d
b E u d E u w v d
b u GC b u CI
ψ π
ψ π π π
π π π
π π π π π
−
−
= − −
= − −
= −
= − + −
= − + = − −
∫ ∫
∫ ∫
∫
∫ ∫
 (10) 
                                                 
7 Note that the definitions of H and U  may be reversed if one has a primitive indicator of health outcomes that 
provides a measure of ill-health with non-zero origin.  This sub-section would then refer to the derived measure 
of well-being. 
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where ( ) ( )( )| |t t t tE u b E hπ π= −   and ( )t tu b h= −  denote conditional and unconditional 
mean ill-health respectively; Utt ttGC GC= −  is the extended generalised morbidity 
concentration coefficient, and ( )Utt t t ttCI h u CI= −  is the extended morbidity concentration 
index.  We note that UttGC  and 
U
ttCI , unlike ttGC and ttCI , will both typically be negative, 
reflecting the concentration of ill-health among the poor, with (10) showing that such 
inequalities in morbidity will lead to a loss in welfare.   
 Equation (3) may be similarly rewritten to yield concentration indices of final ill-
health ranked by initial income, UfsGC  and 
U
fsCI , enabling the change in welfare between the 
two periods to be expressed as: 
( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )
( ) 1 1
1
U U
ff ss f ff s ss
U U U
s f ss ff ss f
W W b u CI b u CI
u u CI CI CI u
− = − − − − −
= − + + −
 (11) 
which shows that reductions in both average morbidity and (the scale of) morbidity 
inequalities will serve to improve overall welfare, with the AGP decomposition of 
( )U Uff ssCI CI−  then serving to identify the causes of any changes in ill-health inequality:  
( ) ( )
( ) ( ),
( )
U U
U U U
U U U U U U CI CI
ff ss ff fs ss fs R H
U U U U CI CI CI
ff fs ss f s s R
f
CI CI CI CI CI CI M M
uCI CI CI CI M P q
u−
− = − − − = −
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞Δ
= − − − = −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
 (12) 
where 
UCI
HM  captures the effect of the relationship between relative morbidity changes and 
individuals’ initial level of income and 
UCI
RM captures the redistributive effect of income rank 
changes weighted by final morbidity status.   
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The income-related ill-health mobility index 
UCI
HM will be positive (negative) if 
expected morbidity changes conditional upon income have the effect of increasing (reducing) 
morbidity inequalities.  
UCI
HM  may in turn be expressed as the product of the progressivity of 
morbidity changes based on initial income rankings ( ) ,UCI s s ss f s sP h u CI CI −= − −  and the 
scale of ill-health changes relative to final average morbidity ( )UCI CIs sq h u q= − , where 
, ,
U
f s s f s sCI CI− −=  is the concentration coefficient of morbidity changes ranked by initial period 
income.  
UCIP will be negative (positive) if changes in morbidity are less (more) concentrated 
among the poor than the initial concentration of ill-health, and will equal zero if relative ill-
health changes are independent of income or there are no ill-health changes.  We further note 
that 
UCIP will be less than CIP  if, as usually will be the case, ssCI is positive.  Thus, if there is 
a uniform change in health status then 
UCIP will typically be negative and CIP positive, such 
that a uniform rise (fall) in morbidity will reduce (increase) relative inequalities in ill-health 
but increase (reduce) relative inequalities in health.  Moreover, if there is a proportionate 
change in morbidity then 
UCIP will be zero and CIP  will typically be positive, such that a 
proportionate rise (fall) in morbidity results in no change in relative inequalities in ill-health 
but to an increase (reduction) in relative inequalities in health.  Whereas, if there is a 
proportionate change in health then 
UCIP will typically be negative with CIP zero, such that 
any resultant rise (fall) in morbidity leads to a reduction (increase) in relative inequalities in 
ill-health but no change in relative inequalities in health.  Finally, if 
UCIP is greater than zero 
then CIP will also typically be positive, such that a rise (fall) in morbidity will increase 
(reduce) relative inequalities in both ill-health and health, whereas if CIP is less than zero 
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then 
UCIP will also typically be negative, such that a rise (fall) in morbidity will reduce 
(increase) relative inequalities in both ill-health and health.   
The morbidity-related income mobility index ( )UCI CIR t t RM h u M= −  will be negative 
(positive) if the absolute value of the concentration index of final period morbidity ranked by 
final income is larger (smaller) than that ranked by initial income, which implies that current 
morbidity is more (less) strongly related to contemporaneous income than to lagged 
incomes,8 and will equal zero if either final period ill-health is uncorrelated with changes in 
income rank or there are no changes in income rank.  In general, 
UCI
RM may be expected to be 
negative as those who move up the income ranking will tend to be less unhealthy (in the final 
period) than those who moved down.  Thus reranking will generally exacerbate inequalities 
in morbidity as well as in health. 
 Finally, replacing health with morbidity in (7) yields the parallel decomposition: 
( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
,
( )
U U U U U
U U
ff ss f ff s ss
U U
s f ff ss
U U U U
ss fs fs ff
U U U
f s s fs ff
GC GC GC GC GC
R H R
GC GC GC GC GC
R H R
W W b u GC b u GC
u u GC GC
u GC GC GC GC
u CI u GC GC
u P q M u M M
h P q M h M M
−
− = − + − − +
= − + −
= −Δ − − + −
= −Δ − − Δ + −
= −Δ − − = −Δ − −
≡ Δ + − = Δ + −
 (13) 
where 
UGC GC
H HM M= −  and 
UGC GC
R RM M= − , given the ‘mirror’ property of the generalised 
concentration index (Erreygers, 2009), with 
UGC GCP P=  and 
UGC GCq q= − . 
                                                 
8 It can again be shown from Milanovic (1997) that U Uff fsCI CI> implies ( ) ( ), ,f f f scorr u corr uπ π>  in the 
special case v=2. 
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3. Empirical illustration 
We investigate the implications of the choice of inequality index by investigating the 
dynamics of income and mental health using the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ) 
measure of psychological well-being (Goldberg and Williams, 1988).  The GHQ measure is 
an (additive) Likert scale which can take values between 0 and 36 with higher values 
corresponding to worse states of mental health.  Following Jones and López Nicolás (2004), 
AGP use (36–GHQ) to obtain a health measure that is increasing in good health.  We report 
results for both the inverted and original measures to explore the sensitivity of our findings to 
whether mobility is measured with respect to health or morbidity.  Furthermore, we not only 
analyse changes in the health concentration index but also in the generalised health 
concentration index, relative inequality index, slope inequality index, and the Wagstaff 
(2002) and Erreygers (2009) normalisations of the concentration index and generalised 
concentration index, respectively, which take into account the bounds of the health measure 
under consideration. 
 Table l provides definitions of the various income-related health inequality measures 
considered in the study together with the corresponding sets of mobility indices.9  The 
income-related health and health-related income mobility indices are readily obtained in each 
case.  The appropriate definition of the disproportionality and scale indices, P and q 
respectively, is less obvious: we choose to define P in each case as the difference between 
some function of initial income-related health inequality ( )ssCIθ , which may be zero, and the 
(extended) concentration index of health changes ,f s sCI − , with q defined conformably.  This 
                                                 
9 Expressions for the corresponding inequality measures and mobility indices defined with respect to morbidity, 
rather than health, are readily obtained by replacing health status h by morbidity u throughout and changing the 
variable bounds a and b to 0 and (b–a). 
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approach is consistent with the definitions of P and q provided in the previous section for the 
extended CI and GC measures, and further implies that the normalisation factor is absorbed 
into q rather than P for those measures that are defined as simple multiples of these indices.  
Accordingly, differences in progressivity as measured by alternative disproportionality 
indices may be interpreted as reflecting differences between the inequality equivalence 
criteria implied by the underlying income-related health inequality measures. 
 The derivation of the mobility indices for the (extended) CI and GC measures has 
already been discussed in the previous section, with the ( )ssCIθ  values of ssCI  and 0 in the 
two cases corresponding to relative and absolute inequality equivalence criteria respectively.  
As is well known, “the relative index of inequality (RII) is equal to the concentration index 
divided by twice the variance of the relative rank variable” (Wagstaff et al., 1991), where 
2 2var( ) ( 1) (12 )N Nπ = −  is a constant determined by the sample size N, and thus the two 
measures, and the resultant mobility indices, simply differ by a multiplicative factor which 
will be approximately equal to 1/12 in large samples (Milanovic, 1997).  The slope index of 
inequality (SII) is simply equal to the RII multiplied by mean health so there is a similar 
relationship between the set of SII and GC indices as between the RII and CI indices.  
Furthermore, the Erreygers (2009) normalisation (EN) of the health concentration index is 
simply equal to ( 4 /( )b a− )GC so the EN mobility indices are also just a multiple of the 
corresponding GC measures.  However the Wagstaff (2002) normalisation is not a simple 
multiple of either the CI or GC measures, nor of some linear combination of the two, 
providing a ‘flexible’ inequality equivalence criterion that is determined by the data rather 
than embodying some particular criterion, whether that be relative, absolute or intermediate 
(see Wagstaff, 2009).  Specifically, the value of ( )( ) ,ss s f ssCI h h CIθ = Ξ  will depend on the 
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initial and final levels of mean health in relation to the lower and upper bounds of the health 
measure a and b.  Note first that if ( ) ( )f sb h h a− = − , which is only likely to be the case if 
average health in the two periods is neither very good nor very bad, then the normalisation 
will exhibit the properties of an absolute measure of income-related health inequality since 
( ),s fh hΞ  will equal zero.  For lower levels of initial average health, the normalisation will 
provide a more ‘rightist’ measure with ( ),s fh hΞ  tending to positive infinity as average 
health tends to a  if 0a > and to ( )1 fh b−  if 0a = .  Conversely, for higher levels of initial 
average health, the normalisation provides an ‘extreme leftist’ measure with ( ),s fh hΞ  
tending to negative infinity as average health tends to the upper bound b.  Which measure is 
the most applicable depends upon public perceptions of income-related health inequality.10 
 Our empirical analysis serves to replicate and extend the results reported in AGP, 
which investigates changes in income-related mental health inequality among men over the 
first nine waves of the BHPS from 1991 to 1999.  The annual BHPS is a longitudinal survey 
of private households in Great Britain, based on an original, nationally representative sample 
of 5,500 households and 10,300 individuals in 1991.  The analysis employs a balanced panel 
consisting of the sub-set of males in the BHPS for whom full data on GHQ score, income 
and a range of other socioeconomic variables are available in each of the first nine waves 
and whose total annual household income lay in the range £2000 to £77000 throughout that 
period:11 the resulting sample contains nine observations on each of 2018 men.  Wave 1 is
                                                 
10 Amiel and Cowell (1997) provides evidence in relation to public perceptions of income inequality that “the 
appropriate inequality equivalence concept depends on the income levels at which inequality comparisons are 
made”, shifting from a relative or ‘rightist’ attitude to an absolute or ‘leftist’ one as income increases.  
11 See Jones and López Nicolás (2004) for a full description of the sample design. AGP note that their results 
differ slightly from those reported in Jones and López Nicolás (2004), possibly due to the use of an updated 
release of the BHPS data (University of Essex, Institute for Social and Economic Research, 2007) 
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Table 1:  Definition of income-related health inequality indices and associated mobility measures. 
 Definition 
Income-related  
health mobility  Disproportionality index Scale factor 
Health-related 
income mobility  
 
Relative inequality measures     
Health concentration 
index  
2 cov( , )tt t t
t
CI h
h
π=  CIH ss fsM CI CI= −  ,
CI
ss f s sP CI CI −= −  CI fq h h= Δ  
CI
R ff fsM CI CI= −  
Relative inequality 
index ( )
cov( , )1
var( )
2 var( )
t t
tt
t
tt
h
RII
h
CI
π
π
π
=
=
 
2 var( )
CI
RII H
H
MM
π
=  RII CIP P=  2 var( )
CI
RII qq
π
=  
2 var( )
CI
RII R
R
MM
π
=  
 
Absolute inequality measures     
Generalised Concen-
tration index  
2cov( , )tt t t
t tt
GC h
h CI
π=
=
 GCH ss fsM GC GC= −  ,
GC
f s sP CI −= −  GCq h= Δ  
GC
R ff fs
CI
f R
M GC GC
h M
= −
=
 
Slope inequality 
index ( )
cov( , )
var( )
2 var( )
t t
tt
tt
hSII
GC
π
π
π
=
=
 
2 var( )
GC
SII H
H
MM
π
=  SII GCP P=  2 var( )
GC
SII qq
π
=  
2 var( )
GC
SII R
R
MM
π
=  
Erreygers (2009) 
normalisation  
4
( )tt tt
EN GC
b a
=
−
 4
( )
EN GC
H H
 M M
b a
=
−
 EN GCP P=  
4
( )
EN GCq q
b a
=
−
4
( )
EN GC
R R
 M M
b a
=
−
 
 
Flexible inequality measures     
Wagstaff (2002) 
normalisation ( )
( )
( )( )tt ttt t
t tt
b aWN GC
b h h a
h GC
−
=
− −
≡ Ω
 ( ) ( )WNH s ss f fsM h GC h GC= Ω − Ω
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
,
,
,
1
1
( )
,
sWN s
ss f s s
f
f s
ss f s s
ss
s f ss f s s
h h
P CI CI
hh
b h h
CI CI
b hh a
h h CI CI
−
−
−
⎛ ⎞Ω⎜ ⎟= − −⎜ ⎟ ΔΩ⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞
−⎜ ⎟= − −⎜ ⎟
−
−⎝ ⎠
≡ Ξ −
( )WN GCfq h q= Ω  ( )WN GCR f RM h M= Ω  
Notes: The variance of the relative rank variable, var( )π , depends only on sample size and is therefore invariant over time.  
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 treated as the initial period throughout the analysis so as to consider the implications of 
lengthening the time span over which the change in socioeconomic inequality is measured.   
Table 2A shows that both average health and all measures of income-related health 
inequality were highest in Wave 1, though there was no clear trend in any of the measures 
over subsequent waves.  The decline in average health is to be expected given the balanced 
nature of the panel.  The decline in income-related health inequality implies that the change 
in inequality between Wave 1 and each subsequent wave was negative for all the measures 
examined in the study.  
AGP note that the decomposition of the change in the health concentration index 
reveals three main points of interest.  First, the index of income-related health mobility CIHM  
is positive over all time spans, implying that the depreciation in the health of the sample had 
the effect of reducing health inequalities since the concentration of health losses among the 
better-off in Wave 1 was greater than the concentration of initial health as indicated by the 
negative values of the disproportionality index PCI.  Second, the health-related income 
mobility index CIRM  is positive for comparisons across all but one wave, implying that 
income-related health inequalities were typically exacerbated by income re-ranking.  Finally, 
the equalising effect of health changes dominated the disequalising effect of income re-
ranking over all time spans, with inequality higher in the first wave than in any subsequent 
wave. 
The results in the remainder of Table 2A serve to illustrate the implications of the use 
of alternative inequality indices as the basis for the mobility analysis.  First, the use of the 
other relative inequality measure, the relative inequality index, clearly leads to the same 
conclusions, with the same values for the disproportionality index and all other measures
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Table 2A. Decomposition of changes in income-related health inequality from Wave 1 (Males only). 
 BHPS Wave  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Average health th  25.9995 25.6824 25.7671 25.7349 25.7354 25.5887 25.6016 25.5466 25.6888 
Average health change hΔ  - -0.3171 -0.2324 -0.2646 -0.2641 -0.4108 -0.3979 -0.4529 -0.3107 
           
Health Concentration Index CItt 0.0102 0.0060 0.0055 0.0040 0.0050 0.0077 0.0074 0.0041 0.0087 
Change in inequality CIff−CIss - -0.0042 -0.0047 -0.0061 -0.0051 -0.0025 -0.0027 -0.0061 -0.0015 
Income-related health mobility MH - 0.0065 0.0073 0.0075 0.0062 0.0074 0.0049 0.0053 0.0046 
    Disproportionality Index P - -0.5238 -0.8142 -0.7260 -0.6036 -0.4595 -0.3131 -0.2983 -0.3807 
    Scale factor  q - -0.0123 -0.0090 -0.0103 -0.0103 -0.0161 -0.0155 -0.0177 -0.0121 
Health-related income mobility MR - 0.0023 0.0027 0.0013 0.0011 0.0049 0.0021 -0.0008 0.0031 
           
Relative Inequality Index RIItt 0.0610 0.0360 0.0330 0.0241 0.0302 0.0462 0.0447 0.0244 0.0521 
Change in inequality RIIff−RIIss - -0.0250 -0.0280 -0.0369 -0.0308 -0.0148 -0.0163 -0.0366 -0.0089 
Income-related health mobility MH - 0.0388 0.0441 0.0448 0.0372 0.0443 0.0292 0.0317 0.0276 
    Disproportionality Index P - -0.5238 -0.8142 -0.7260 -0.6036 -0.4595 -0.3131 -0.2983 -0.3807 
    Scale factor  q - -0.0741 -0.0541 -0.0617 -0.0616 -0.0963 -0.0933 -0.1064 -0.0726 
Health-related income mobility MR - 0.0138 0.0160 0.0079 0.0064 0.0294 0.0129 -0.0049 0.0187 
           
Generalised Concentration 
Index. GCtt 0.2643 0.1541 0.1416 0.1034 0.1298 0.1969 0.1907 0.1039 0.2231 
Change in inequality GCff−GCss - -0.1102 -0.1228 -0.1609 -0.1346 -0.0675 -0.0736 -0.1605 -0.0413 
Income-related health mobility MH - 0.1694 0.1916 0.1948 0.1621 0.1929 0.1286 0.1397 0.1214 
    Disproportionality Index P - -0.5340 -0.8244 -0.7362 -0.6138 -0.4697 -0.3233 -0.3084 -0.3908 
    Scale factor  q - -0.3171 -0.2324 -0.2646 -0.2641 -0.4108 -0.3979 -0.4529 -0.3107 
Health-related income mobility MR - 0.0591 0.0688 0.0339 0.0275 0.1255 0.0550 -0.0208 0.0802 
………..Table continues on next page 
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Table 2A continued………….. 
 BHPS Wave  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Slope Inequality Index SIItt 1.5860 0.9245 0.8495 0.6206 0.7785 1.1811 1.1443 0.6233 1.3385 
Change in inequality SIIff−SIIss - -0.6614 -0.7365 -0.9654 -0.8075 -0.4049 -0.4417 -0.9627 -0.2475 
Income-related health mobility MH - 1.0161 1.1495 1.1688 0.9727 1.1576 0.7718 0.8381 0.7286 
    Disproportionality Index P - -0.5340 -0.8244 -0.7362 -0.6138 -0.4697 -0.3233 -0.3084 -0.3908 
    Scale factor  q - -1.9028 -1.3944 -1.5876 -1.5847 -2.4647 -2.3874 -2.7174 -1.8641 
Health-related income mobility MR - 0.3547 0.4130 0.2034 0.1652 0.7527 0.3302 -0.1246 0.4811 
           
Erreygers (2009) normalisation ENtt 0.0294 0.0171 0.0157 0.0115 0.0144 0.0219 0.0212 0.0115 0.0248 
Change in inequality ENff−ENss - -0.0122 -0.0136 -0.0179 -0.0150 -0.0075 -0.0082 -0.0178 -0.0046 
Income-related health mobility MH - 0.0188 0.0213 0.0216 0.0180 0.0214 0.0143 0.0155 0.0135 
    Disproportionality Index P - -0.5340 -0.8244 -0.7362 -0.6138 -0.4697 -0.3233 -0.3084 -0.3908 
    Scale factor  q - -0.0352 -0.0258 -0.0294 -0.0293 -0.0456 -0.0442 -0.0503 -0.0345 
Health-related income mobility MR - 0.0066 0.0076 0.0038 0.0031 0.0139 0.0061 -0.0023 0.0089 
           
Wagstaff (2002) normalisation WNtt 0.0366 0.0209 0.0193 0.0141 0.0177 0.0266 0.0258 0.0140 0.0303 
Change in inequality WNff−WNss - -0.0157 -0.0173 -0.0225 -0.0189 -0.0100 -0.0108 -0.0226 -0.0063 
Income-related health mobility MH - 0.0237 0.0267 0.0271 0.0227 0.0270 0.0183 0.0198 0.0172 
    Disproportionality Index P - -0.5500 -0.8404 -0.7522 -0.6298 -0.4855 -0.3392 -0.3242 -0.4068 
    Scale factor  q - -0.0431 -0.0317 -0.0361 -0.0360 -0.0555 -0.0538 -0.0611 -0.0422 
Health-related income mobility MR - 0.0080 0.0094 0.0046 0.0038 0.0170 0.0074 -0.0028 0.0109 
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differing by a multiplicative factor of 0.1666.  Second, the use of the generalised 
concentration index shows that health depreciation is equalising in absolute as well as in 
relative terms, with the negative value of the GC disproportionality index implying that 
health losses were concentrated among the better-off in Wave 1.  Moreover the equalising 
effects of health changes continues to dominate the effects of income re-ranking, which are 
generally disequalising as before.  Third, the use of either of the other absolute inequality 
indices, the slope inequality index and Erreygers (2009) normalisation, leads inevitably to the 
same conclusions as for the generalised concentration index, with the same values for the 
disproportionality index and all the other measures differing only by a simple multiplicative 
factor.  Fourth, the use of the Wagstaff (2002) normalisation leads to essentially the same 
conclusions as for all the other indices, with the equalising effects of health depreciation 
again dominating the disequalising effects of reranking, which is to be expected given that 
the values of the disproportionality index in this case imply a somewhat more ‘leftist’ 
inequality equivalence criterion than even that implied by the absolute inequality indices.  
Finally, Table 2B illustrates the implications of basing the mobility analysis on a 
measure of morbidity rather than of good health.  Average health was highest in Wave 1 so 
average morbidity is lowest in this wave.  Additionally, all the inequality measures indicate 
that the scale of income-related ill-health inequality was greatest in Wave 1, with the 
negative values implying that ill-health was concentrated among the poor.   
Comparison of the first set of results, for the decomposition of the change in the 
morbidity concentration index, with those presented in AGP shows that measuring health 
outcomes in terms of morbidity rather than good health makes little difference to the 
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Table 2B. Decomposition of changes in income-related morbidity inequality from Wave 1 (Males only). 
 BHPS Wave 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Average morbidity tu  10.0005 10.3176 10.2329 10.2651 10.2646 10.4113 10.3984 10.4534 10.3112 
Average morbidity change uΔ  - 0.3171 0.2324 0.2646 0.2641 0.4108 0.3979 0.4529 0.3107 
           
Morbidity Concentration Index UttCI  -0.0264 -0.0149 -0.0138 -0.0101 -0.0126 -0.0189 -0.0183 -0.0099 -0.0216 
Change in inequality U Uff ssCI CI−  - 0.0115 0.0126 0.0164 0.0138 0.0075 0.0081 0.0165 0.0048 
Income-related ill-health mobility MH - -0.0172 -0.0193 -0.0197 -0.0165 -0.0196 -0.0134 -0.0145 -0.0126 
    Disproportionality Index P - -0.5604 -0.8508 -0.7626 -0.6402 -0.4961 -0.3497 -0.3349 -0.4173 
    Scale factor  q - 0.0307 0.0227 0.0258 0.0257 0.0395 0.0383 0.0433 0.0301 
Morbidity-related income mobility MR - -0.0057 -0.0067 -0.0033 -0.0027 -0.0121 -0.0053 0.0020 -0.0078 
           
Relative Inequality Index UttRII  -0.1586 -0.0896 -0.0830 -0.0605 -0.0758 -0.1134 -0.1100 -0.0596 -0.1298 
Change in inequality U Uff ssRII RII− - 0.0690 0.0756 0.0981 0.0827 0.0451 0.0485 0.0990 0.0288 
Income-related ill-health mobility MH - -0.1034 -0.1159 -0.1179 -0.0988 -0.1174 -0.0803 -0.0870 -0.0754 
    Disproportionality Index P - -0.5604 -0.8508 -0.7626 -0.6402 -0.4961 -0.3497 -0.3349 -0.4173 
    Scale factor  q - 0.1844 0.1363 0.1547 0.1544 0.2367 0.2296 0.2600 0.1808 
Morbidity-related income mobility MR - -0.0344 -0.0404 -0.0198 -0.0161 -0.0723 -0.0318 0.0119 -0.0467 
           
Generalised Concentration 
Index. 
U
ttGC  -0.2643 -0.1541 -0.1416 -0.1034 -0.1298 -0.1969 -0.1907 -0.1039 -0.2231 
Change in inequality U Uff ssGC GC− - 0.1102 0.1228 0.1609 0.1346 0.0675 0.0736 0.1605 0.0413 
Income-related ill-health mobility MH - -0.1694 -0.1916 -0.1948 -0.1621 -0.1929 -0.1286 -0.1397 -0.1214 
    Disproportionality Index P - -0.5340 -0.8244 -0.7362 -0.6138 -0.4697 -0.3233 -0.3084 -0.3908 
    Scale factor  q - 0.3171 0.2324 0.2646 0.2641 0.4108 0.3979 0.4529 0.3107 
Morbidity-related income mobility MR - -0.0591 -0.0688 -0.0339 -0.0275 -0.1255 -0.0550 0.0208 -0.0802 
………..Table continues on next page 
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Table 2B continued………….. 
 BHPS Wave 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Slope Inequality Index UttSII  -1.5860 -0.9245 -0.8495 -0.6206 -0.7785 -1.1811 -1.1443 -0.6233 -1.3385 
Change in inequality U Uff ssSII SII−  - 0.6614 0.7365 0.9654 0.8075 0.4049 0.4417 0.9627 0.2475 
Income-related ill-health mobility MH - -1.0161 -1.1495 -1.1688 -0.9727 -1.1576 -0.7718 -0.8381 -0.7286 
    Disproportionality Index P - -0.5340 -0.8244 -0.7362 -0.6138 -0.4697 -0.3233 -0.3084 -0.3908 
    Scale factor  q - 1.9028 1.3944 1.5876 1.5847 2.4647 2.3874 2.7174 1.8641 
Morbidity-related income mobility MR - -0.3547 -0.4130 -0.2034 -0.1652 -0.7527 -0.3302 0.1246 -0.4811 
           
Erreygers (2009) normalisation UttEN  -0.0294 -0.0171 -0.0157 -0.0115 -0.0144 -0.0219 -0.0212 -0.0115 -0.0248 
Change in inequality U Uff ssEN EN− - 0.0122 0.0136 0.0179 0.0150 0.0075 0.0082 0.0178 0.0046 
Income-related ill-health mobility MH - -0.0188 -0.0213 -0.0216 -0.0180 -0.0214 -0.0143 -0.0155 -0.0135 
    Disproportionality Index P - -0.5340 -0.8244 -0.7362 -0.6138 -0.4697 -0.3233 -0.3084 -0.3908 
    Scale factor  q - 0.0352 0.0258 0.0294 0.0293 0.0456 0.0442 0.0503 0.0345 
Morbidity-related income mobility MR - -0.0066 -0.0076 -0.0038 -0.0031 -0.0139 -0.0061 0.0023 -0.0089 
           
Wagstaff (2002) normalisation UttWN  -0.0366 -0.0209 -0.0193 -0.0141 -0.0177 -0.0266 -0.0258 -0.0140 -0.0303 
Change in inequality U Uff ssWN WN− - 0.0157 0.0173 0.0225 0.0189 0.0100 0.0108 0.0226 0.0063 
Income-related ill-health mobility MH - -0.0237 -0.0267 -0.0271 -0.0227 -0.0270 -0.0183 -0.0198 -0.0172 
    Disproportionality Index P - -0.5500 -0.8404 -0.7522 -0.6298 -0.4855 -0.3392 -0.3242 -0.4068 
    Scale factor  q - 0.0431 0.0317 0.0361 0.0360 0.0555 0.0538 0.0611 0.0422 
Morbidity-related income mobility MR - -0.0080 -0.0094 -0.0046 -0.0038 -0.0170 -0.0074 0.0028 -0.0109 
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substantive findings in this particular case study.  Thus, the negative values of the index of 
income-related morbidity mobility 
UCI
HM  imply that the observed change in health outcomes 
also had the effect of reducing inequalities in ill-health because morbidity changes were 
more concentrated among the rich than the initial distribution of ill-health: the negative 
values of the disproportionality index 
UCIP in this case follow inevitably from the negative 
values of PCI reported in Table 2A.  Second, income re-ranking typically served to 
exacerbate inequalities in morbidity as well as in health, with the negative values of 
UCI
RM implying that those who moved up the income distribution tended to be less unhealthy 
in the final period than those who moved down.  Finally, the equalising effects of health 
outcome changes dominate the disequalising effects of income re-ranking as before. 
Nevertheless, this correspondence between the health and morbidity findings is not 
guaranteed with the use of a relative measure of inequality.  To ensure strict equivalence an 
absolute measure of inequality, such as the generalised concentration index, must be 
employed, with the results presented for these measure in Tables 2A and 2B simply differing 
in terms of the sign of the matching mobility indices.  By way of counter-example, we note 
finally that the results for the Wagstaff (2002) normalisation in Table 2B imply an 
‘intermediate’ rather than ‘extreme leftist’ inequality equivalence criterion when changes in 
inequality are measured with respect to morbidity rather than health. 
 
4. Conclusions 
This paper sets out to further elaborate the approach to the longitudinal analysis of income-
related health inequalities proposed in Allanson, Gerdtham and Petrie (2010).  The resultant 
contribution is twofold.  First, we establish the normative basis of the AGP mobility indices 
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by embedding the AGP decomposition of the change in the health concentration index 
within a broader analysis of the change in “health achievement” or wellbeing.  In particular, 
we show that AGP’s income-related health mobility index provides an ‘ex-ante’ measure of 
health mobility in which individuals’ health changes are evaluated on the basis of their 
positions in the initial income distribution, with this asymmetric treatment potentially 
justifiable on the grounds that the initially poor are disadvantaged to the extent that they face 
a worse lottery of future health possibilities than those who are better off.  We are further 
able to show within our framework that income re-ranking leads to a loss of welfare to the 
extent that it exacerbates income-related health inequalities.  
Second, we demonstrate that the decomposition procedure set out in AGP may also 
be used to analyse the change in a range of other commonly-used income-related health 
inequality measures, including the generalised concentration index and the relative inequality 
index.  The choice of inequality measure is shown to affect the results of the subsequent 
mobility analysis to the extent that different inequality measures embody alternative 
inequality equivalence criteria, though such differences in results prove not to be of a 
substantive nature in the illustrative empirical study reported in the paper.  We further note 
that mobility analyses based on absolute inequality measures, such as the generalised 
concentration index, have the desirable property that the conclusions will be invariant to 
whether inequality is measured with respect to health or morbidity.  However, the exact 
choice of inequality measure should not be guided by analytical convenience but by public 
perceptions of what health changes constitute an improvement in income-related health 
inequalities, on which little is currently known. Until more is known about these values, 
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studies should present findings using both relative and absolute measures in order to provide 
policymakers with a fuller assessment of the nature of health changes taking place. 
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